Abstract-We use a unit commitment (UC) model to quantify the operational impacts of subsidizing wind generation when energy prices are negative. Such prices occur increasingly often in U.S. and European Union (EU) markets. Subsidies such as production tax credits, feed-in tariffs, and renewable energy credits motivate renewable generators to submit negative price offers; this lessened flexibility increases system operation and management costs and, in some cases, CO emissions when energy prices are negative. Our simulations of large negative bids can also be interpreted as representing EU policies of granting wind absolute dispatch priority. Applications to four hypothetical systems with high wind penetration and distinct generation mixes quantify the UC and dispatch effects of negative bids. Larger negative bids lead to less wind spillage (reducing the 2.8% average curtailment under $0 bids to 1.0%), more conventional plant startups, higher system costs, and, in many cases, higher total emissions (by up to 2%). In some systems, wind power's effective incremental emissions are as high as coal's. This impact depends strongly on generation mix, carbon price, and the size of the negative bids. In general, there can be significant economic and, often, environmental benefits to reforming renewable support policies to encourage flexibility in operations.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ENEWABLE energy targets and incentive mechanisms have been adopted around the world and, by and large, have been successful in promoting wind development [1] , [2] . Examples include Australia's 20% Expanded Renewable Energy Target and Spain's Renewable Action Plan (REP) 2011-2020 for meeting European Union (EU) 2020 targets. Most U.S. states have adopted renewable portfolio standards in which renewable generation creates credits that can be used to meet the standards, while the US government has a wind production tax credit amounting to approximately $26/MWh produced. In the EU, feed-in tariffs are more prevalent, which pay a guaranteed amount per MWh for renewable production. [3] - [5] have studied the impact of regulatory interventions Manuscript designed to stimulate the growth of wind power, reaching conclusions about which policies might best stimulate investment. As a result of these subsidies, renewable producers have a strong incentive to maximize the energy they generate and minimize curtailment, or "spill." The strength of this incentive is illustrated by the 2011 political controversy in the Pacific Northwest over the financial impacts to wind producers of the Bonneville Power Authority's decision to spill wind and instead generate hydropower. This incentive affects wind bidding strategies, motivating them to submit large negative bids (e.g., 26 /MWh) to ensure that they are dispatched; such negative bids are rational as long as their magnitude does not exceed the subsidy.
Many studies have addressed the impacts of wind energy on the economic and environmental performance of system operations, but relatively few have focused on the impacts of curtailment [6] . Most are ex ante engineering-economic analyses that simulate operations accounting for wind variability or forecast errors as they interact with load, other types of generation, and transmission. Others are ex post statistical analyses of the past effects of wind. As examples, Barth et al. [7] apply a market model based on stochastic unit commitment. Voorspools et al. [8] use a stacking model to estimate wind's impact on the Belgian power system, while Holttinen et al. [9] estimate CO effects with a commercial production costing model. Chen et al. [10] optimize the dispatch of wind and then solve for the optimal wind penetration for Taiwan's power system. Li and Kuri [11] study cost, emissions and security effects of wind using dynamic programming. Denny and O'Malley [12] use a dispatch model to quantify CO , NO and SO emission impacts. Other studies with similar goals include [13] , [14] . Almost all of these studies conclude that wind helps reduce system operating costs and emissions. However, others [15] , [16] point out that high wind penetration could increase the cycling of conventional plants, causing, in some times and places, increased emissions; however, the net effect of wind on emissions is usually beneficial [17] .
Power engineers have made important contributions to policy debates about the environmental and economic value of wind through papers such as the above. As in those papers, we attempt to inform policy discussions by using systems models that capture key features of systems operations. Here, we focus on the desirability and impacts of allowing wind to make negative offers in energy markets. We apply unit commitment models to quantify the dispatch, cost, and CO impacts of negative bids during periods of negative energy prices.
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same time that negative bidding decreases that flexibility. Negative bidding diminishes flexibility because prices have to be lower (negative) to induce wind to curtail, which means that thermal generation has to vary more in compensation. For example, the California ISO (CAISO) has identified inflexible bidding (by which they mean negative bidding) by both thermal and wind plants as contributing to future violations of energy balances during steep ramp events [18] . In response, the CAISO has changed market rules to encourage more flexible bids that will allow output curtailments when prices are very low or increase offered by thermal plants when energy is scarce [19] . Policies to promote more flexible bidding by wind could include market rules (such as in the CAISO) that provide a stronger profit incentive to curtail production during over-generation periods, and policy reforms that would maintain subsidies for estimated curtailed production during times of negative prices [20] . The goal of this paper is to quantify the potential economic and environmental benefits to system operations of policies that promote more flexible (less negative) bidding by wind power. Since the impacts of negative bids likely depend on system size and the mix and flexibility of its generators [21] , we explore the factors that influence the impacts of wind bidding under different generation mixes using a unit commitment model and generator performance data based on actual US experience. We find that the exact cost and, especially, emissions impacts of negative wind bids depend strongly on generation mix and flexibility, the magnitude of negative bids, pollution prices, volatility of wind, and other system characteristics. When market prices are below zero, negative bidding generally increases system O&M costs. Sometimes emissions fall, but more often they increase, on occasion making incremental wind power as polluting, in effect, as coal-fired power plants. We conclude that the economic and environmental benefits of wind power integration can be significantly enhanced by reforming policies in order to encourage more flexible bidding by wind producers. This paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes the commitment model. Section III documents load, fuel mix, and other assumptions for the four case studies. Results are presented in Section IV, including the effects of negative wind bids on wind curtailment, thermal generator starts, and total system costs and emission. Conclusions follow in Section V.
II. UC MODEL
This is a short-run analysis with fixed generation capacity. Thermal capacity is committed and dispatched against one week (168 hours) of load (net of wind generation). Wind is bid into the market at a (usually negative) price, and can be curtailed. We neglect transmission congestion, modeling all generation and load as taking place at one bus. There is neither storage nor demand response. Spinning reserve requirements are considered in addition to energy in a sensitivity analysis. UC problems have been formulated in diverse ways [22] , [23] . Our model is a modified version of the formulations in [24] , [25] . Details are provided in an online appendix [26] .
The objective function minimizes the sum of costs of startups, energy (including fixed hourly fuel consumption, if committed, as well as negative bids by wind), emissions (if taxed), unserved load, and wind curtailment cost. The $/MWh wind curtailment cost simulates the negative energy offers of wind producers in response to subsidies. However, the true social cost to the market of lost wind subsidies (in the form of credit prices, tax credits, or feed-in tariffs) is zero because the subsidy is a transfer from taxpayers or ratepayers to the wind producer. Although the curtailment cost (negative bid) affects commitment and dispatch decisions because of its presence in the model's objective function, the estimates we report below of the system cost impacts of negative bidding omit the curtailment cost because it is a transfer payment.
Decision variables include two binary variables for each thermal generating unit and hour that describe the unit's commitment status and whether a startup occurs. Generation (MW) is a continuous decision variable (one for each hour and unit, including an aggregate wind unit).
The constraint set includes an energy balance for each hour Also, the constraints given below are enforced for each thermal unit.
• Energy production during the hours in the startup period follows a prescribed pattern, based on the type of unit.
• When committed, energy dispatch after startup is bounded by its minimum and maximum capacity. Further, ramp limits bound the changes in energy production.
• Minimum down-and up-times are enforced.
• Startups occur when commitment changes from off to on. To maximize the realism of this study, we base our data assumptions on USEPA hourly continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS) data [27] . Fuel consumption and emissions rates are estimated as a function of whether a startup is in process and, after startup, the generation level of the plant. We furthermore analyzed CEMS data to test whether fuel use and emissions not only depend on hourly generation level, but also on whether a unit is ramping up, ramping down, or in steady state. Surprisingly, however, our statistical analysis did not reveal a significant effect of ramping upon fuel use and emissions, for a given hourly MW output, even though we considered data from a large number of plants of various types. The reason may be the temporal coarseness of the data; hourly time steps may obscure important within-hour variations. Because within-hour variations in wind output could increase the variability of generator output on a finer time scale, it is desirable to use subhourly data in future research to analyze whether within-hour ramps might affect emissions and costs. Unfortunately such data are not presently available publicly.
Our analysis of CEMS data finds that, for an hourly time step, fuel consumption and MWh generation usually have a linear relationship after a unit has started up and reached its minimum capacity (see Fig. 1 for an example). Thus, we model marginal heat rates as constant. Since we could not detect a significant difference between heat rates under ramp up/down or steadystate conditions, marginal heat rates are also modeled as being independent of unit ramping.
One important difference between our UC model and [24] , [25] is that we explicitly model production and emissions patterns of thermal units during startup hours. CEMS data indicate that each unit (especially if coal-fired) has a distinctive pattern of fuel use and MW output during starts. Further, as Fig. 2 shows, a significant amount of fuel may be consumed in the first several hours even though no power is produced. To model startups, we introduce a third binary variable , which is 1 in a time interval for unit if that unit has started up at time -. This variable allows us to enforce a predetermined pattern of startup generation, fuel use and emissions.
The resulting mixed-integer linear program is solved using CPLEX with a branch-and-bound optimality gap of 0.00%, so that the global optimum is reached. For a model with generating units, the model size is 504 binary variables, continuous variables, and constraints. Our largest model has 80 generators and thus has about 40 000 binary variables, 120 000 continuous variables, and 200 000 constraints.
III. ASSUMPTIONS OF CASE STUDIES
A. Generator Data
We use data on generators from the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) as the basis for our fossil unit characteristics. A sample of 15 units includes the major types and sizes of fossil-fueled generators. Each has distinct costs, emissions and flexibility characteristics ( Table I) .
The systems include: high nuclear and coal (NUCL), high coal (COAL), high combined cycle (CCGT), and high steam gas (SGAS) ( Table II) . These represent a range of actual conditions, e.g., the CAISO, Spanish and Texas systems have, respectively, a low, medium, and high share of coal plant. The least flexible system is NUCL because the nuclear unit always operates at its full capacity of 1000 MW. Consequently, it has the least amount of rampable capacity and the highest minimum production (Table II) . The nuclear unit's parameters are derived from [28] , including a marginal cost of $7.49/MWh.
In sensitivity analyses, we also consider much larger systems in order to assess whether cost and emissions effects depend on system size. Those systems have five times as many units as in Table II (45 to 80 , depending on the generation mix). For realism, cost and emissions data are varied slightly among the duplicate units.
B. Demand and Wind Profiles
Both wind and demand data for the considered week are based upon a sample of hours from summer 2012 for the ERCOT system. Note that the generator, wind and demand data that we extracted from the ERCOT system are used only to formulate four sample systems, and our case studies are not meant to represent Texas. We rescale the ERCOT values to a peak load of 4500 MW and peak wind output of 3300 MW (Fig. 3 ). This wind production amounts to 35% of weekly energy demand (cf. the 9% experienced in Texas in 2012), which is similar, for instance, to the present level of Danish production and the CAISO renewable target of 33% by 2020. Our peak load results in a thermal reserve margin of 10%, slightly more than ERCOT's standard of 8.7% [29] .
Our sensitivity analyses consider winter and fall wind profiles as well, which exhibit less variability, in order to assess the robustness of the results with respect to those assumptions.
A very high ($100,000/MWh) value of lost load is assumed. Lower values are considered in our sensitivity analyses.
IV. CASE STUDIES: RESULTS
By increasing the magnitude of the (negative) energy bid for wind in the UC model, we force the systems to spill less wind. We consider a broad range of negative bids, analyzing their effect on system costs (excluding wind curtailment penalties) and CO emissions. The largest negative bid (minus $300/MWh) can also be viewed as a simulation of the EU policy of absolute priority of wind in system dispatch, where wind must be taken unless system reliability is jeopardized.
Sections IV-A-IV-C examine the effects of negative bids on wind curtailment, fuel costs, and CO emissions, respectively, assuming a CO price of $21/ton. Section IV-D considers the impact of reducing the CO price to $5/ton. Sections IV-E-IV-H present sensitivity analyses that consider how our conclusions are affected by alternative assumptions, including higher startup costs, no carbon regulation, a spinning reserve requirement, different unserved load penalties, alternative wind profiles, and larger systems. We also compare the cost and emissions benefits of more wind capacity to the impacts of negative bids.
A. Negative Bids and Flexible Systems Lessen Wind Curtailment
As Table II shows, the four test systems have varying amounts of flexibility, with NUCL being least flexible. We expect more wind curtailment in inflexible systems because the starting or ramping of inflexible units, such as coal, can be costly. When wind rapidly rises and there is too little rampable capacity that is generating above its minimum output, then wind must be curtailed. Curtailment can also occur if all committed units are producing their minimum levels (which in inflexible systems are higher), or there is transmission congestion (not considered here). Such conditions occur increasingly often in systems with growing wind production. which has similarly large amounts of wind. 1 In general, less flexible systems curtail more wind when zero is bid (left-most point on the -axis), and the curtailment shrinks as the bid becomes more negative (rightward movement on -axis). The figure reveals that wind spillage is much higher in the inflexible NUCL system than in other systems and falls less rapidly as negative wind bids increase in magnitude. The other three cases have similar curtailments to each other, reflecting their similar ramp capabilities (last two rows, Table II) . 1 In one extreme month, wind met 64% of demand in Spain (September 2012), but is typically around 18% [40] . Spain's wind curtailment in the first three months of 2010 was [38] but up to 6.8% is expected in the future. As the magnitude of the negative wind bid increases (from $0/MWh to 100 /MWh), wind curtailment is roughly halved in the flexible systems, and falls from 10% to 8% for NUCL. It might naively be assumed that since less thermal output is required as wind usage grows, costs and CO emissions will decrease as well. However, as we show below, the opposite is often (but not always) the case. This is because production is less efficient and more starts are required if thermal production is more variable, even if, overall, less energy is generated.
For each system, the number of starts increases as more wind is forced into the system when wind bids less flexibly (larger negative bids) (Fig. 5) . A very flexible system, like SGAS, can lower its output in anticipation of wind peaks without having to shut down units, and so has fewer starts and stops. SGAS is more flexible because the minimum output of the four steam gas units is around 7%-20% of their capacity in contrast with 40%-70% for the coal and CCGT units (Table I) .
B. Larger Negative Bids Increase System Operating Costs
The minimum (optimal) total system cost, excluding wind bids, will always be obtained when a zero bid for wind is assumed. 2 We exclude wind bids because they are not a net real resource cost to society. As explained above, this is because the direct cost to society of reducing wind output by 1 MWh is zero; this is true even though the wind owner loses tax credits or renewable credits revenue, as those payments are merely transfers from the government or ratepayers, and not a real resource cost. Thus, negative offers will usually increase system fuel and nonfuel O&M costs if more wind is used. Generally, if X MWh less wind is curtailed under a negative bid of compared when when zero is bid, then system costs will increase by approximately . (This is a first-order analysis that assumes that curtailment decreases in an approximately linear fashion as wind bids become more negative.) Fig. 6 confirms our expectation that costs (excluding wind curtailment costs) rise for all systems as wind's negative bid grows. The amount of cost increase when 100/MWh is bid rather than zero is about 1% for the inflexible NUCL test system, and for the other systems. On the other hand, the cost 2 We prove this by contradiction. Say that a negative wind bid yields a feasible solution that has a lower total cost (excluding wind bids) than the optimal feasible solution for a $0/MWh bid. But 1) both solutions are feasible under either bid and 2) the former solution would then have a lower objective function under a $0/MWh bid than the latter solution. This is a contradiction because the latter solution is assumed to be optimal under the $0/MWh bid. increas is almost negligible for bids smaller in magnitude than 30/MWh, which is roughly equivalent to the size of the US production tax credit for wind in 2013. Thus, the cost distortion appears small if wind bids only reflect that subsidy, and renewable energy credits or other subsidies do not motivate bigger negative bids.
Another way to express the cost impact of negative wind bidding and wind must-take requirements is to divide the cost increase by the MWh of additional wind energy taken as the bid increases in magnitude. Table III shows the calculations; the next-to-last row (under a $21/ton carbon price) shows total cost increases of $20 to $90 for each additional MWh of wind injected. This expense is comparable to the incremental cost of fossil-fueled generation; thus, system efficiency can be significantly decreased by inflexible (negative) wind bidding.
C. Larger Negative Bids May Increase or Decrease CO
However, it is not a priori obvious whether CO emissions should increase or decrease under larger wind negative bids. On one hand, one might expect that reducing wind curtailment and thus thermal production would decrease CO emissions. This is likely if generators have very similar heat rates and use the same type of fuel, while at the same time startup costs are mainly in the form of non-fuel rather than fuel costs. On the other hand, if starts involve burning significant amounts of fuel, then if accommodating more wind requires more starts and stops of thermal units, we might then expect that the CO emissions from additional starts would more than make up for reduced emissions from lower thermal energy production. Our simulations below show that more complex behavior is possible as well, such as CO emissions first falling and then rising as the bid magnitude increases, or vice versa.
The behavior of CO emissions is shown in Fig. 6 , and varies both qualitatively and quantitatively among the four test systems. For the two most inflexible systems (NUCL and COAL, as gauged by the amount of ramp and minimum capacities in the last three rows of Table II) , CO emissions monotonically increase as the size of the negative wind bid goes up (and thus as wind curtailment goes down). Therefore, forcing the system to take more wind when prices are negative increases both emissions and costs under the specific assumptions of those cases. Thus, wind is, on the margin, harmful both economically and environmentally under such circumstances.
One reason for this emissions increase is suggested by Fig. 5 , where the number of generator starts for each system under each wind bid is shown. It reveals that the number of starts increases most sharply for NUCL as the bid magnitude increases, and it turns out that the increases in emissions from those starts offset the decreases from reduced fossil-fueled generation. (See Fig. 7 , which breaks down the emissions from starts and thermal energy generation under the two extreme bids of zero and 300/MWh.) Between bids of $0 and 80/MWh, the number of starts increases by almost 50% for NUCL. Fig. 7 shows that emissions from starts more than make up for the decrease in operating emissions from producing less energy.
On the other hand, the system with several gas steam units (SGAS) instead exhibits a decreasing trend of total emissions. This is because those units are highly flexible, being able to decrease output to very low values and ramp up quickly. Consequently, fewer additional starts occur (Fig. 5 ) and if they occur, they emit less CO compared to coal starts.
Further examination of Fig. 7 shows that, as might be expected, the COAL system emits the most CO while the NUCL system emits the lowest amount. However, a surprising result is that NUCL produces the most startup emissions, even more than COAL. Both systems have a similar share of coal units but since the nuclear units are base-loaded, the NUCL systems cycles and starts up its coal units more often. The placement of coal plants in the merit order also explains the difference in the emissions pattern of the SGAS and CCGT cases (Fig. 7) . SGAS has higher energy-related emissions, but lower startup emissions. This difference arises from the fact that in the CCGT case, its combined cycle units are base-loaded while the coal units are forced to startup more often, while in the SGAS case, coal plants are base-loaded instead while the gas steam units are cycled.
We now summarize the impact of negative bidding by wind on emissions by calculating the average change in emissions per MWh of incremental wind usage due to increasing negative bids. The last row of Table III shows that when the size of wind bids increase from $0 to 300/MWh, emissions go up in three out of four systems, at a rate of 0.21 to 0.88 tons/MWh ($21/ton carbon price case). For the two systems with the highest such rates, the effective emissions of using more wind are equivalent to the emissions rates of coal-fired power plants ( ton/MWh). Thus, forcing the system to take wind when energy prices are negative can result in incremental wind generation that is effectively as dirty as coal generation. Put differently, avoiding those extra emissions can be viewed as the environmental benefit of more flexible wind bidding and operation.
D. CO Price Impacts on Wind Curtailment and Emissions
Power plant owners in most of the US do not pay for CO emissions, with the exception of California and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) region. Here, we consider how the price of CO interacts with negative wind bids. Above, we assumed a relatively high cost of carbon ($21/ton), while in this section we consider a lower value. The "social cost of carbon" (SCC) is used by the U.S. federal government as an estimate of the monetized damages associated with incremental carbon emissions. In 2010, this value was $21/ton CO (in 2007 dollars) [30] , comparable to the 2008 value of European Union Emissions Trading System (ETS) carbon allowances . However, by May 2013, the value of the ETS carbon spot price dropped to a record low of (roughly the same as the cost of RGGI allowances today). Therefore, we consider two cases for CO emission prices, $21/ton CO (Sections IV-A-IV-C, above) and $5/ton CO .
As would be expected, the total CO emissions increase when the carbon price goes down. This growth in emissions is due to emissions dispatch, a key part of any optimal emissions reduction strategy, as is well known in the EU [31] and from previous experience in the US with SO trading [32] . However, the amount of increase depends on the system's flexibility. For the inflexible NUCL system, the total CO emission increase is insignificant, around 1%. In contrast, for a flexible system, like SGAS, the increase in total CO emissions is large, around 16%, as coal is moved up in the merit order, being baseloaded rather than cycled. For all systems, the lower CO cost incents increased coal generation by shifting production from gas units. Finally, total cost decreases significantly under the $5/ton carbon price (by about one-quarter) mainly because of the dramatic fall in the expense of carbon.
The effect upon CO emissions of the interactions of CO price with negative wind bids is more complex. For the most inflexible system NUCL, the lower carbon price increases the emissions growth resulting from negative bidding (Table III,  Row 3) . For other systems, however, the lower carbon price sometimes inflates the impact of negative bidding, sometimes dampens it, and sometimes even changes the sign of the impact (Fig. 8) . For the more flexible systems, CO initially drops as more wind is absorbed, but then increases, so that there is an intermediate wind bid that minimizes emissions. We therefore conclude that the effect of negative wind bidding on emissions strongly depends not only on system generation mix, but also on carbon price in ways that are not necessarily intuitively obvious.
E. Sensitivity Analyses: Reserve Requirements, Maintenance Costs, no CO Costs, and Unserved Load Penalty
Spinning reserve (SR) and maintenance costs (MCs) are added in the model to further assess the sensitivity of results to key assumptions. We also consider the effects of alternative penalties for unserved load and carbon. The SR requirement is set to 3% of the load. MCs are added by adjusting the startup cost upwards by estimates in [33] for typical lower bounds for costs of cycling (based upon medium costs for cold, warm and hot starts). This adjustment increases startup costs by 28% to 267%. Since a CO price is not charged in most of the US, we assume a $0/ton CO penalty. Finally, the unserved load penalty is reduced to $1000/MWh. We combine these various assumptions into three sensitivity cases:
• case SR: 3% SR requirement;
• case SRMC: 3% SR requirement plus higher startup costs (reflecting maintenance, wear & tear); and • case SRMCA: 3% SR, higher startup cost, $1000/MWh penalty for unserved load, $0/ton price for CO emissions. In general, these alternative assumptions did not change the overall trends of curtailment, total cost, and startup frequency for the four systems examined. The situation for emissions is more complicated, depending strongly on the characteristics of the systems (see Table IV ). In some of these three cases, there is actually a switch in the direction of change for CO emissions as the bid size is increased from $0 to 300/MWh. However, general patterns of differences among the four systems are preserved: NUCL has the highest wind curtailment, COAL has the highest CO emission and total system cost, CCGT has the greatest number of startups and SGAS has the least emissions and wind curtailment. Introducing spinning reserve requirements (case SR) results in tighter capacity balances, with the sum of energy and SR requirements moving closer to total capacity during peak periods. This causes most of the systems to commit more capacity and then curtail additional wind in some hours because of over-generation. At one extreme, the inflexible NUCL case curtails more than three times as much wind as previously; however, the very flexible SGAS system can absorb just as much wind as before. The number of starts is reduced by 10-50% in the higher startup cost cases because more plants are operated as base load units. This is in turn tends to push up total CO emissions (especially when carbon price drops to $0/ton CO ). Finally, a lower price for unserved load results in a small amount of lost load at times when the wind drops at the same time that demand is ramping up quickly. This lower price for unserved demand provides the system some demand-side flexibility, which decreases the number of required plant startups, and thus helps to ameliorate the emission impacts of negative wind bidding.
F. Sensitivity Analyses: Alternative Load and Wind Patterns
The results above are based on typical summer ERCOT load and wind patterns, with wind increased to match the assumed renewable penetration. We also have repeated the analyses for alternative wind scenarios, representing typical fall and winter conditions in ERCOT (Fig. 9) . Although the average wind was rescaled to be the same percentage of load (about 1/3), the wind patterns are quite distinctive. The summer week winds are more variable, with wind often following a diurnal pattern of increasing as the ground heats and then cools during the day. Winter and fall winds, by contrast, vary more slowly, often reflecting the passage of cold and warm fronts. 3 In the case of the fall winds, just as in Fig. 6 , three out of four of the systems experience higher CO emissions under high negative wind offers, with the nuclear system experiencing the largest relative increase (1.6% under a bid of minus $300/MWh, just like Fig. 6 ). However, under the winter winds, the peak winds are relatively low and the variation is less than for the other seasons; as a result, there is very little (0.1%-0.2%) wind curtailment for the three coal and gas-dominated systems, and negative wind bidding has a negligible impact on CO emissions. Thus, we conclude that the impacts of negative bidding are reduced if the pattern of wind is less variable and peaky, such that curtailment is very low even under $0/MWh bidding by wind. Only if curtailment is larger (in the 2% to 10% range, as 3 These patterns are reflected statistically in the average daily wind volatilities, which we define as the standard deviation of ( -), expressed as a percent of the day's average wind MW, where is the hourly wind. In summer, this volatility is 18%, while in fall and winter it is 15%. The sample weeks have average volatilities of 24% in the summer scenario and 17% in the fall and winter scenarios, all of which are slightly above average. experienced under summer and fall winds) does negative bidding appreciably change dispatch, costs, and emissions.
G. Sensitivity Analyses: Larger Systems
In order to verify the applicability of our conclusions to larger and thus more realistic power systems, we have repeated the analyses of Fig. 6 for much larger systems. We multiplied the load and wind profiles by a factor of 5, yielding a peak load of about 18 GW. We again considered four generation mixes, but now with 5 times as many units as in Table II (up to 80 generators) by replicating the units. The costs and efficiencies of duplicated units are varied slightly for realism.
The results are qualitatively the same as for the original systems. The total cost and the frequency of startups are as large as the original systems. The percentage of wind curtailment is almost identical. Finally, the general trends of cost impacts parallel those in Fig. 6 . For emissions, like Fig. 6 , the CO impacts are larger for the nuclear and high coal systems than for the gas-dominated systems. Further, the nuclear and coal emissions trends are broadly similar for the larger and smaller systems, as are the implied tons/MWh impact of forcing more wind into the system. This is illustrated by the small and large system emissions curves in Fig. 10 ; the larger system has an implied emissions rate of 1.33 tons CO /MWh of incremental injected wind, while the smaller system has a value of 0.84 tons/MWh (from Table III , last row). However, the results were somewhat less consistent between the two system sizes for the gas-based systems; but like Fig. 6 , the emissions impacts for the CCGT and steam gas systems are relatively small and sometimes positive and sometimes negative. Thus, cost and emissions effects appear to depend more on generation mix than on system size.
H. Sensitivity Analysis: Effect of Additional Wind Capacity in Comparison to the Effect of Negative Wind Bids
To make this comparison, we considered two different wind capacities for case NUCL, while holding other assumptions constant. After increasing wind capacity from 25% to 35%, total system cost falls by 16% and CO emissions by 14%, assuming that wind bids zero. However, negative bidding by wind claws back some of those benefits, increasing cost by 0.5%-1.5% and emissions by 0.3%-1.5%. Thus, roughly 10% of the incremental benefits of adding wind in this case are lost because of negative bidding. This reinforces our conclusion that policies that promote negative bidding are likely to maximize the economic and environmental benefits of wind.
V. CONCLUSION
The economic and environmental benefits of wind power depend on the complex interactions of load and wind distributions, generation mix, market prices, transmission constraints, and emissions policies, among other factors [34] . A unit commitment model is used to assess the operational economic and environmental impacts of negative bidding by wind generation that results from subsidies and of wind "must-take" requirements, such as those in the European Union. Four test systems, including high nuclear and coal, high coal, high CCGT and high gas steam, have been considered, as have the impacts of alternative assumptions about CO prices, startup costs, spinning reserves, wind distribution, and system size.
Our specific numerical results apply only to the systems studied. However, based on our wide range of sensitivity analyses, we can draw the following general conclusions for systems in which a significant ( -) of wind would be curtailed if wind energy is offered to the market at a zero price. First, wind curtailment is greater when the overall generation mix is inflexible, as measured by low amounts of total rampable capacity and high minimum run levels. Second, larger negative energy bids for wind force the system to accept more wind generation even though energy prices are negative. Here, high negative bids ( 300/MWh) decrease curtailment from an average of 2.8% of wind generation (across 16 weeks of operation considered in the base cases and sensitivity analyses) to 1.0%. Third, although this extra wind generation reduces thermal generation, system fuel and O&M costs unambiguously increase under negative bidding, which claw some of the economic & environmental benefits back. Fourth, negative wind bids lead to more starts and stops for generators and associated CO emissions, which partially and, in many cases, more than fully offset emissions reductions due to decreased thermal generation. In many cases, system emissions increase significantly (by almost 2% in the least flexible systems), and the incremental wind generation is, in effect, as dirty as coal-fired production. Only for the most flexible generation mixes do we see some weeks in which emissions decrease when more wind is injected during periods of negative energy prices.
Thus, the precise cost and environmental effects of allowing negative bids, or requiring that all wind be taken subject to reliability constraints, depend on the particular system. For the sake of generality and brevity, our analysis here has focused on the impacts of broadly different generation mixes by considering four test systems, considering several wind patterns and two different system sizes as variants. The nuclear system we considered, being the least flexible, showed the largest CO and cost increases as a result of negative wind bidding. The exact impacts depend on the variability of wind, with the steadier winter wind scenario resulting in less impact.
However, demand response, hydro generation, and energy storage could also have a large impact on the flexibility of a power system and the impact of wind injections during negative price periods (e.g., [35] ). Future research should consider systems with these resources, as well as the impact of transmission constraints, which have contributed to wind curtailment in Texas and other systems. Consideration of emissions and cost effects on a finer time scale than the hourly impacts we modeled will also provide more fine-grained conclusions. For instance, although our analysis of hourly CEMS data did not reveal a linkage between ramping and costs or emissions, consideration of smaller (e.g., 15 minute) intervals may uncover such relations. Finally, possible interactive effects of wind and load forecast errors with bidding strategies could be quantified using, for instance, stochastic commitment models.
We can conclude that policies that encourage wind to bid flexibly (i.e., zero or small negative bids) will improve short-run system cost performance and in some cases emissions as well. This will help society to reap the full economic and environmental benefits of wind power integration. Such policies might include, for instance, changing renewable energy credit or tax credit systems so that they provide credits even for curtailed wind, based on statistical or other estimates of how much wind energy would have been provided in the absence of curtailment. If negative wind offers are of the magnitude of today's US federal production tax credit ($26/MWh), the resulting cost and environmental improvements are likely to be relatively modest. The benefits of such policy reforms will be more significant where there are both state and federal policies that together result in much larger subsidies (and thus more negative bids) while, at the same time, there is significant ( -) wind curtailment.
